Abstract: A firm's business-level strategy dictates how the firm competes in its chosen line of business. Porter (1996) argues that the best way for a firm to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage in its chosen market is to reinforce its business-level strategy with a host of activities, including functional policies, organization structure, etc. The choices made by each firm are likely to determine, to some extent, the level of tax avoidance because the firm strategies are, in part, based on firms' willingness to deal with risk and uncertainty. Thus, we examine whether a firm's business strategy, as defined by the Miles and Snow typology (1978), influences its level of tax avoidance. We find that firms engaging in a strategy that focuses on minimizing and reducing the uncertainty of costs (defenders) avoid fewer taxes than firms that not only follow a strategy focusing on product differentiation and the aggressive pursuit of opportunities, but are more willing to deal with uncertainty (prospectors). Our results suggest that even though defenders could engage in tax avoidance activities to lower costs, prospectors are more willing to engage in tax planning efforts that have uncertain outcomes.
Introduction
A firm's business-level strategy dictates how the firm will compete in its chosen market.
1 Porter (1996) argues that the best way for a firm to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage in its chosen market is to reinforce its business-level strategy with a host of activities, including functional policies, organization structure, etc. The choices made by each firm are likely to determine, to some extent, the level of tax avoidance because the firm strategies are, in part, based on firms' willingness to deal with risk and uncertainty. Thus, we investigate whether a firm's business-level strategy influences it tax planning activities (i.e., tax avoidance).
2
Investigating whether a firm's business strategy influences its level of tax avoidance is interesting for at least two reasons. First, prior literature finds that there is substantial variation in firms' propensities to avoid income taxes (Dyreng et al. 2008 ). This variation not only remains largely unexplained but also may be highly idiosyncratic and determined by a number of factors and their interactions (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) .
Prior literature has documented an association between tax avoidance and several firmlevel characteristics (i.e., research and development activities, growth, capital intensity, etc). The theoretical work of Miles and Snow (1978) identifies several of these firmlevel characteristics as reflective indicators of a firm's business strategy. Therefore, examining the association between tax avoidance and a combination of these firm-level characteristics, reflective of a firm's overall business strategy, should lead to a more comprehensive understanding of firms' tax avoidance activities.
Second, it remains unclear in the literature why seemingly similar firms engage in varying degrees of tax avoidance. For example, firms within the same industry and with similar incentives (and potentially similar opportunities) to engage in tax planning, 1 Business-level strategy is not the same as corporate strategy. Corporate strategy is concerned with the overall purpose and scope of the business (Hambrick 1983 ) whereas business-level strategy is concerned with how the firm competes in its chosen field of business. 2 Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , we view tax avoidance as a continuum that ranges from clearly legal (e.g. investments in municipal bonds) to those of questionable legality (e.g. tax shelters). Thus, tax avoidance refers to any activity that reduces a firm's explicit tax liability relative to its pretax income.
exhibit substantial variation in their efforts to avoid income taxes. Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) and Hambrick (1983) document that business strategies can vary within a single industry. Therefore, if there is a relation between firms' business strategy and tax avoidance, it may explain the intra-industry variation in firms' tax avoidance activities.
Although several influential business strategy typologies exist, (e.g., Abell 1980; Porter 1980) , we use the Miles and Snow (1978) typology to define firms' business strategies because of the advantages it possesses over other typologies. 3 Specifically, employing the Miles and Snow (1978) typology is advantageous because of its detailed theoretical orientation and its generalizability across industry settings. Miles and Snow (1978) contend that four basic patterns or strategies emerge as firms attempt to best adapt to their competitive environment, and that three of these strategies may be fitted on a continuum. At one end of the continuum are defenders, which are firms that follow a cost leadership strategy. Defenders are firms that tend to have a narrow product domain, a focus on efficiency and avoiding uncertainty, and a stable organizational structure. At the opposite end of the spectrum are prospectors, which are firms that follow a differentiation strategy. 4 Prospectors have a very broad product domain, a focus on innovation and change, a more flexible organization structure, and less emphasis on avoiding uncertainty. Although Miles and Snow (1978) do not consider the tax avoidance behavior of their topology of firms, the attributes of these groups may lend themselves to an increased or decreased emphasis on tax planning.
To determine the extent of their tax avoidance activities, firms trade off the marginal benefits against the marginal costs of managing tax expense. Tax avoidance activities not only increase cash flow, but increase accounting earnings in certain circumstances (e.g., tax credits and permanent book-tax differences). Tax avoidance costs include planning and implementation expenses, potential penalties imposed by tax authorities and 3 For example, Porter's (1980) strategy has been criticized as for its lack of detailed theoretical orientation and its inability to generalize to large firms, while Abell's (1980) typology has been criticized for its inability to differentiate among firms that follow cost leadership strategies, firms that fall in the middle of the strategy spectrum and firms lacking any apparent strategy (Chrisman et al. 1988 , Smith et. al. 1989 . 4 Miles and Snow (1978) also identify two additional strategies, analyzers and reactors. Analyzers have attributes of both defenders and prospectors and fall somewhere in between these two strategies on the continuum. Reactors do not follow any consistent strategy but rather only respond to environmental change (Miles and Snow 1978) .
reputation costs if the firm's tax avoidance activities are deemed to be aggressive and subject to public scrutiny. The difference between defender and prospector firms' tax avoidance levels depends on the impact of the differential characteristics of these two strategies on the benefits and costs of tax avoidance. For example, because defenders are interested in minimizing costs, defender firms may benefit more from the increased tax savings generated by tax avoidance activities than prospector firms. Yet, at the same time, the cost of devising and implementing tax planning strategies can be expensive and thus, for cost conscious defender firms, the benefit of additional tax savings may not outweigh the costs of implementing the tax avoidance strategies. In addition, defenders' emphasis on stability and their need to reduce uncertainty suggests that these firms could be more concerned with 1) the uncertainty associated with tax avoidance that makes cost minimization more difficult, 2) the potential penalties imposed by tax authorities and 3) the reputation damage associated with public disclosure of involvement with particularly egregious avoidance activities.
Relative to defenders, prospectors are less concerned with minimizing costs, and more focused on growth and innovation, possibly making tax minimization less of a concern for these types of firms. Nevertheless, prospectors are known for aggressively pursuing new opportunities and it is possible that this aggressive culture influences their level of tax avoidance. In addition, prospectors tend to have a greater propensity for risk, and thus may be more willing to engage in more aggressive tax positions, relative to defenders. Thus, because it is unclear whether defenders engage in more or less tax avoidance activities than prospectors, we investigate this issue empirically.
To address our research question we begin by creating a measure (STRATEGY) designed to provide a score that reflects the most likely business strategy adopted by sample firms. The score is based on variables identified in prior literature as characteristics of firms' business strategies. Because Miles and Snow (1978) suggests that competitive strategy can be classified as a continuum between two different strategic orientations, with prospectors at one end and defenders at the other end, we identify defenders as those firms having the lowest value and prospectors as those having the highest value of our STRATEGY measure. All other firms are classified as analyzers.
Analyzers have attributes of both prospectors and defenders and fall somewhere in between these two strategies on the continuum.
To examine firms' tax avoidance activities, we use two different effective tax rate measures drawn from prior literature. Our first measure, the book effective tax rate defined as total tax expense divided by pre-tax book income (adjusted for special items), captures tax avoidance activities that directly affect net income through total tax expense.
Our second measure, the cash effective tax rate, defined as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book income (adjusted for special items), reflects the level of cash taxes paid to tax authorities. Lower effective tax rates reflect increased tax avoidance.
Using data from 1998 to 2008, we regress each of our measures of tax avoidance on our continuous measure, STRATEGY, and control for other factors that prior literature suggests are associated with tax avoidance. We find that defender firms engage in less tax avoidance than prospector firms, as demonstrated by higher book and cash effective tax rates. These results suggest that defender firms' concern with the costs and uncertainties associated with tax avoidance outweighs the benefit of additional tax savings.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our results contribute to the stream of research that investigates the variation in firms' tax avoidance activities. Prior research has documented an association between tax avoidance and firmlevel characteristics, executive characteristics, and managerial incentives (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2009; Phillips 2003; Rego 2003; Rego and Wilson 2009 ). We extend this line of research with evidence that a firm's business strategy influences its level of tax avoidance. In doing so, we respond to Hanlon and Heitzman's (2010) conjecture that tax avoidance is most likely explained by a number of factors and interactions by providing evidence that a firm's strategy, which represents a broader view of the firm and is identified based on a range of determinants, is a determinant of level of tax avoidance.
Furthermore, our results contribute toward a better understanding of the impact of different competitive strategies on firms' tax planning and reporting practices.
Our study also links two streams of literature: organizational theory from the management literature and tax avoidance from the accounting literature. Our study contributes to these two streams of literature in several ways. First, we develop a proxy of organizational business strategy that is constructed using publicly available data, and is more comprehensive than existing proxies in accounting 5 or management. Thus, our measure can be used in future research in both management and accounting settings. Second, we contribute to the management literature by providing evidence that firms' tax planning activities are associated with their organizational strategy. Thus, our results empirically support Porter's (1996) argument that firms should reinforce their businesslevel strategy with support activities in order sustain a competitive advantage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses prior research and develops the hypotheses, Section three presents the research design, Section four explains the sample selection process and provides descriptive statistics, Section five provides the results of the main analyses, and Section 6 presents our sensitivity analysis and Section 7 concludes.
Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development

Prior Literature on the Determinants of Tax Avoidance
Prior tax avoidance studies generally focus on firm-level characteristics, including but not limited to an association between tax avoidance and firm-level characteristics such as size, the magnitude of foreign operations, capital intensity, leverage, and research and development expense (e.g. Armstrong et al. 2009; Dyreng et al. 2009; Phillips 2003; Rego 2003) . 7 In addition, several studies provide evidence of differing investments in tax planning to lower effective tax rates. For example, Mills et al. (1998) provide evidence that firms' tax planning expenditures are associated with lower effective tax rates. 8 Cook et al. (2008) provide evidence that the magnitude of tax fees paid to the external auditor 5 The exception is a concurrent working paper (Bentley, Omer and Sharp 2010) that tests whether certain business strategies are associated with more financial reporting irregularities. They use similar measures to construct their measure of firms' business strategies. They find that prospector firms are more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities. Thus, given the findings in Frank et al. (2009) , their results are complementary to our results. 6 Thus far, the accounting literature has examined organizational strategy as a determinant of compensation (Ittner et al. 1997) , the outsourcing of the corporate tax function (Dunbar and Phillips 2001) , and audit fees and accounting irregularities (Bentley, Omer and Sharp 2010) . 7 See Zimmerman (1983) , Gupta and Newberry (1997) , Mills et al. (1998) , Rego (2003) , Stickney and McGee (1982) , and Shevlin and Porter (1992) . In addition, see Callihan (1994) Although prior studies have linked tax avoidance to firm-level characteristics and managerial incentives, the literature is still unable to explain much of the variation in measures of tax avoidance. For example, it remains unclear why firms within the same industry, with seemingly similar incentives and opportunities, engage in different levels of tax avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that tax avoidance may be highly idiosyncratic and determined by a number of factors and their interactions. Accordingly, prior literature has documented an association between tax avoidance and several firmlevel characteristics (i.e., research and development activities, growth, capital intensity, etc). The theoretical work of Miles and Snow (1978) identifies several of these firmlevel characteristics as reflective indicators of a firm's business strategy. Examining the association between tax avoidance and a combination of these firm-level characteristics should therefore lead to a more comprehensive understanding of firms' tax avoidance activities. Therefore, we provide evidence on whether business-level strategy influences firms' tax avoidance activities.
Business Strategy and Tax Avoidance
Within the strategic management literature, the Miles and Snow (1978) typology is one of the most popular and well cited theories of strategic types. Miles and Snow (1978) argue that different competitive strategies arise from the way companies decide to address three fundamental problems: entrepreneurial, engineering, and administrative problems. 9 The entrepreneurial problem relates to how a firm should manage its market share. The engineering problem involves how a company should implement its solution to the entrepreneurial problem. The administrative problem considers how a company should structure itself to manage the implementation of the solutions to the first two problems. Miles and Snow (1978) Several studies have examined the association between business strategies and certain firm characteristics (e.g., Snow and Hrebiniak 1980; Ittner et al. 1997; Simons 1987) . Hambrick (1983) classifies firms as either prospectors or defenders using productmarket data and examines the relation between organizational strategy and firm performance. He finds that defenders outperformed prospectors in terms of current profitability and cash flows. Ittner et al. (1997) examine whether firms place more weight on non-financial measures in chief executive officer (CEO) bonus contracts when they follow a prospector strategy. They construct a measure of firm strategy and use this measure to classify firms as either prospectors or defenders. They find that CEOs of 9 Miles and Snow (1978) refer to the process by which firms align themselves with their environment as the adaptive cycle 10 Miles and Snow (1978) identify a fourth group of firms, reactors. These firms do not follow any consistent strategy but rather only respond to environmental change and thus are expected to change over time. Miles and Snow (1978) note that this strategy is not viable in the long-run. Organizations are often forced into this strategy when top management is unwilling (or unable) to develop distinctive competencies, organizational structures or management processes required by a particular strategy.
prospector firms are compensated more on the basis of non-financial measures than defender firm CEOs. Phillips and Dunbar (2001) is the only study that examines the association between business strategy and corporate tax planning. The authors classify firms as either defenders (nongrowth firms) or prospectors (growth firms), and examine the relation between these two strategies and the outsourcing of the corporate tax function activities.
The authors argue that prospectors (growth firms) focus less on minimizing income tax expense, and thus will outsource more of their tax-planning and -compliance activities.
Their results are consistent with this hypothesis. However, this study does not explicitly address whether prospectors engage in more or less tax avoidance than defender firms.
Furthermore, Phillips and Dunbar classify firms as prospectors and defenders based on single variable (i.e.,, growth). Prior theoretical and empirical research in management provides evidence that strategy is multidimensional, however, and should not be defined on the basis of a single variable (e.g. Miles and Snow 1978, Hambrick 1983 ).
Although Miles and Snow (1978) do not consider the tax avoidance behavior of their topology of firms, the attributes of these groups should lead to an increased or decreased emphasis on tax avoidance. Thus, we examine whether the business strategies defined by the Miles and Snow topology are associated with more or less tax avoidance, which depends on the impact of the differential characteristics of these two strategies on the benefits and costs of tax avoidance. The benefits of tax avoidance include greater tax savings, while the costs include planning and implementation costs, potential penalties imposed by the IRS and reputation costs (Chen et al. 2010 ).
On one hand, the Miles and Snow (1978) 's topology suggests that the potential benefits of tax avoidance are greater for defender firms than prospector firms because defender firms emphasize cost efficiency as the cornerstone of competitive advantage whereas prospectors are focused more on innovation and growth and less on cost minimization. Therefore, because defenders are primarily interested in minimizing costs, and because income tax expense is a major cost for most firms, firms following a defender strategy should benefit more from the increased tax savings generated by increased tax avoidance activities than firms following a prospector strategy.
Alternatively, although defenders should benefit more from tax planning than prospectors, the costs and uncertainty associated with tax avoidance may be greater than the tax benefits for defender firms. Although tax planning strategies may create additional tax savings, the cost of devising and implementing these strategies can be extensive. For example, Mills et al. (1998) contend that while all firms may engage in some baseline amount of planning to comply with tax laws, some firms may find that the cost of additional investments in tax planning outweigh the benefits. Thus, for cost conscious defender firms, the benefit of additional tax savings may not outweigh the cost of implementation.
Moreover, another important cost of tax avoidance is due to uncertainty regarding the long-term success of sustaining aggressive tax strategies and the potential penalties imposed by tax authorities. This cost is more likely to have a substantial effect on defender firms' competitive position relative to prospectors. The structure and processes of the defender organization are all designed to reduce uncertainty within the organization. Therefore, the inherent uncertainty associated with sustainability, an audit by a tax authority and potential penalties threatens defender firms' need for stability and predictability (Miles and Snow 1978) . Specifically, these penalties create an additional and potentially significant unexpected cost for defender firms, which could threaten their competitive position because cost efficiency is an important prerequisite for their success.
Alternatively, the prospector strategy is more conducive to uncertainty and thus taking on more risk. Because these firms often aggressively pursue new opportunities before detailed planning is completed, outcome certainty is not central to their competitive strategy. Thus, for these firms, engaging in particularly risky tax avoidance strategies would not, based on the Miles and Snow description of these firms, appear to threaten their competitive position as significantly as defender firms.
Finally, another potential non-tax cost for defender firms is the reputation damage from being associated with a particular egregious tax avoidance strategy. Defender firms' operate in very narrow product domains, offer limited products (relative to prospectors), and compete through cost leadership and quality (Miles and Snow 1978) . Because these firms compete on the basis of cost and not innovation, substitutes most likely exist for these firms' products or services. Thus, the negative publicity associated with being a "bad" corporate citizen could impose a greater cost on defender firms' competitive position because customers can easily find substitutes for their product or services.
Alternatively, because prospector firms generate more unique products, it may be difficult for consumers of such products to find an appropriate substitute.
Overall, both the benefits and costs of tax avoidance appear to be greater for defender firms than for prospector firms. Thus, it is unclear whether defenders will exhibit higher or lower levels of tax avoidance relative to prospectors. Based on these arguments, we state the following null hypothesis:
H1: Organizational business strategies are not associated with firms' levels of tax avoidance
Research Methodology
Measure of Strategy
To categorize firms into their business strategy groups, we create a measure, STRATEGY, designed to provide a score that reflects the most likely business strategy adopted by sample firms. To construct the STRATEGY score, we follow prior literature and identify variables which reflect different facets of this unobserved construct. We first follow Ittner et al. (1997) and include the following variables: (1) the ratio of research and development to sales, (2) the ratio of employees to sales and (3) the market-to-book ratio. 11, 12 We then expand upon this construct to include the following additional measures based on the theoretical work of Miles and Snow (1978) and the empirical work of Hambrick (1983) : (4) the ratio of advertising expenses to total sales and (5) fixed asset intensity. Consistent with Ittner et al. (1997) , all variables are computed using a rolling average of the respective yearly ratios over the prior five years. 11 We also consider an alternative measure of growth in order to capture the sporadic growth of prospectors and the steady growth of defenders. To capture the rate of growth, we compute the coefficient of variation on the change in total assets. We use this measure in place of market-to-book in the STRATEGY score. Our results are robust to this measure. 12 Ittner et al. (1997) use a fourth measure, the number of new products and services, which requires access to a proprietary database. Our goal in creating the STRATEGY score is to create a measure the can be easily reproduced using publicly available data.
Each of the five measures is intended to capture different elements of a firm's organizational strategy. The ratio of research and development to sales (RD/SALES5) serves as a measure of a firm's propensity to seek new products. Because prospectors engage in greater amounts of innovative activity, they are expected to have higher research and development costs than defenders (Hambrick, 1983) . The ratio of employees to sales (EMP/SALE5) is a proxy for a firm's ability to produce and distribute its goods and services efficiently (Thomas et al. 1991) . Because defenders focus on organizational efficiency, we expect firms following this strategy to have fewer employees per dollar of sales. The ratio of market value to book value (MtoB5) is a proxy for a firm's growth or investment opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Bushman et. al 1996) . Consistent with Ittner et al. (1997) , we expect prospectors to have greater growth opportunities than defenders. We include the ratio of advertising expense to total sales (MARKET5) as a proxy for firms' emphasis on marketing and sales. 13 Prospectors spend more time motivating, educating and informing their customers, thus we expect them to have higher advertising expense than defenders. Furthermore, Hambrick (1983) finds that prospectors have higher marketing expenses relative to defenders. Last, we include a measure of fixed asset intensity (PPEINTENSITY5), measured as the ratio of gross property, plant and equipment to lagged total assets. This measure is designed to capture a firms' focus on production assets, and thus higher ratios would be representative of defender firms (Hambrick, 1983 
Measures of Tax Avoidance
The tax avoidance literature has developed several proxies of tax avoidance. 16 To proxy for firms' tax avoidance activities, we estimate firms' book and cash effective tax rates. We use two different proxies of tax avoidance because the proxies, although correlated, capture different types of tax avoidance.
Our first measure of tax avoidance is the book effective tax rate (BOOK_ETR). Robinson et al. 2010) . It is designed to capture avoidance activities that directly affect net income via the tax expense. 18 Prior literature suggests that a lower ETR reflects higher incidences of tax avoidance (e.g., Gupta and Newberry 1992; Rego 2003) .
Our second measure of tax avoidance is the cash effective tax rate (CASH_ETR).
Following Dyreng et al. (2008 Dyreng et al. ( , 2009 ), we define CASH_ETR as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book income (adjusted for special items). The cash ETR captures all tax avoidance activities that reduce cash taxes paid to the authorities. Therefore, the cash ETR reflects avoidance activities that defer income taxes to later periods (i.e., activities that create temporary differences and do not affect net income), as well as those that avoid tax entirely (i.e., activities that create permanent differences and affect net income).
This measure's numerator excludes changes in the tax contingency reserve and the deferred tax asset valuation allowance, which affect current and deferred tax expense, 16 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) identify 12 proxies of tax avoidance. 17 Dyreng et al. (2008 Dyreng et al. ( , 2009 ) adjust pretax income for special items because these items can be quite large in magnitude and introduce volatility in one-year ETR measures. 18 The book ETR has several limitations. In addition to tax avoidance activities, the book ETR also reflects non-avoidance activities such as changes in the valuation allowance and changes in tax reserves. Furthermore, the numerator is total tax expense, which represents the sum of current and deferred taxes. Deferred taxes represent future tax payments or refunds that are associated with temporary book-tax differences. Therefore, tax avoidance activities that generate temporary differences are not reflected in ETR (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). respectfully. Cash payments relating to prior years, however, are included in CASH_ETR. Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest that lower values of CASH_ETR represent higher levels of tax avoidance.
Several measurement issues arise when using ETRs to measure tax avoidance.
One particular measurement issue regarding ETRs concerns firms with negative pretax income or tax refunds (i.e., negative tax expense). Although we retain loss firms and firms with negative tax expense in our sample, their ETRs are distorted and, thus, difficult to interpret. 19 To address this problem, we follow Gupta and Newberry (1997) and set the ETR: (1) to zero for firms with negative tax expense, and (2) to 100 percent for firms with positive tax expense and negative (or zero) pretax income. 20 Another measurement issue concerns the effect of relatively small values in the denominator of the ETR, thus giving rise to unreasonably large ETRs. To address this problem, we follow Gupta and Newberry (1997) and constrain ETRs to lie between zero and 100 percent.
Empirical Model
To examine the association between tax avoidance and organizational strategy,
we estimate the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
Where:
19 For example, the ETR of a firm with negative tax expense and negative pretax income will be positive, even though the firm paid no taxes. Similarly, the ETR of a firm with positive tax expense and negative pretax income will be negative, even though the firm paid taxes. 20 There is no clear solution for dealing with the measurement issues created by the inclusion of these firms. Therefore, we perform a sensitivity analysis (discussed later) where we exclude loss firms. The results are qualitatively similar. We estimate equation (1) for each measure of tax avoidance (BOOK_ETR and CASH_ETR). Firms that engage in more tax avoidance will have lower book ETRs and/or cash ETRs. A negative coefficient on STRATEGY would suggest that prospector firms engage in more tax avoidance than defender firms, while a positive coefficient would suggest than defender firms engage in more tax avoidance than prospectors.
In addition to our variable of interest, we also include several control variables drawn from the effective tax rate literature. We include a variable for firm size (SIZE) because prior literature documents that it is an important determinant of ETRs (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Mills et al. 1998; Rego 2003) . Prior research finds mixed results between size and ETRs, and thus, we do not predict a sign for , the coefficient on SIZE.
We include a control for the presence of foreign operations (FOREIGN) because multinational firms may have more opportunities to avoid income taxes than domestic firms (Mills et al. 1998; Rego 2003) . Multinational firms also face taxation on profits in multiple jurisdictions or may have foreign tax credit limitations (Markle and Shackelford 2009 ). Therefore, because prior research finds mixed results between the presence of foreign operations and ETRs, we do not predict a sign for , the coefficient on FOREIGN. We include a firms' financial leverage (DEBT) as a control for the complexity of firms' financial transactions because firms have the ability to minimize taxes through financing transactions (Mills et al. 1998 ). Yet, firms with higher leverage may have less need for other non-debt tax shields, and thus engage in less tax planning to reduce taxes (Graham and Tucker, 1996) . Because prior research finds mixed results between debt and the ETR, we do not predict a sign for , the coefficient on DEBT. In addition, we also control for firm profitability (ROA) and the presence of a net operating loss (NOL) to proxy for a firm's need to avoid taxes (Rego 2003; Wilson 2009 ).
Consistent with Chen et al. (2010), we control for firms' levels of intangible assets (INTAN) due to the differing book and tax treatments of intangible assets.
However, opportunities to shift income could also be represented by INTAN (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Hanlon et al. 2007 ). Thus, we do not predict a sign for , the coefficient on INTAN. Finally, we include industry and year fixed effects because prior research documents that tax avoidance varies by industry and year (Rego, 2003) . All variables are defined in Appendix C.
Prior research has documented an association between R&D, capital intensity and tax avoidance (e.g. Mills et al. 1998) , and therefore, we add two additional controls to equation (1), the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets (PPEINTENSITY) and total research and development expense divided by beginning of the year total assets (R&D). Although we use these two variables to construct our STRATEGY measure, we include them as control variables in the main model to alleviate the concern that our results may be driven by firms with high R&D expense or firms with significant property, plant and equipment (PPE).
Last, in estimating equation (1), endogeneity is unlikely to be of critical concern in our setting, as it is unlikely that a firm's level of tax avoidance prompts the firm to follow one strategy over the other. However, assuming that a firm's strategy is not entirely preordained by its operating environment and is partially shaped by management, there is an issue of why some firms follow one strategy over the other. 21 This self selection bias introduces a potential omitted correlated variable problem as some of the determinants may affect a firm's level of tax avoidance. To address this problem, we include a comprehensive list of controls in our empirical model. To justify the use of the Miles and Snow typology (1978) , which is most applicable at the business unit level, we exclude firms that earned less than 70 percent of their sales from a single industry. This criterion was originally suggested by Rumelt (1974) , and helps to establish comparability across firms. To identify firms with less than 70 percent of their sales in a single industry, we use Compustat Segment data to identify the various industries in which the firm operates. We then total segment sales by industry, and divide by the firm's total sales. As indicated in Table 1 , these criteria result in the exclusion of 54,821 firm-year observations.
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Sample
Next, we delete 14,092 firm-year observations associated with a subsidiary or foreign incorporated unit, as these firms face different reporting incentives or regulatory scrutiny. Consistent with prior literature, we also delete 13,932 firm-year observations associated with firms in financial services and regulated industries (2-digit SIC codes 49, 60-69). All data used to construct the STRATEGY score requires a five-year rolling average, therefore we delete 48,505 firm-year observations with insufficient data to 21 Management's ability to determine a firm's business-level strategy appears to be more of a concern in the early stages of the firm's life cycle. Miles and Snow (1978) contend that the decisions made by management during one adaptive cycle constrain their choice in the next cycle. Furthermore, once a particular business-level strategy is adopted, it is often difficult to change (Hambrick 1983) . Therefore, computing strategy over the current and prior four years should also address the concern regarding managerial discretion over business-level strategy construct the 5-year rolling average. We delete 9,896 firm years with insufficient data, [Insert Table 3 here] Table 4 presents the results of our multivariate analyses. 22 In column (A), we report the results of estimating equation (1) using BOOK_ETR as the dependent variable using the full sample. We find that the coefficient on STRATEGY is -0.0032 (p-value = <0.001), which suggests prospector firms avoid more taxes than defender firms. In column (B), we report the results of re-estimating equation (1) using CASH_ETR as the dependent variable. Again, we find that prospector firms avoid more taxes than defenders. Specifically, the coefficient on STRATEGY is -0.0042 (p-value = <0.001).
Multivariate Results
Main Results
The economic significance between firms' organizational strategy and the book and cash effective tax rates is based on the interpretation of the coefficient on STRATEGY. The coefficient on a continuous independent variable reflects the effect of a one-unit increase in that variable on the dependent variable. For example, for every one point increase in STRATEGY, there is a .32 percent decrease in the book effective tax rate. Therefore, moving from a score of 5 (defender-type firm) to a score of 25 (prospector-type firm) is associated with a 6.4 percent decrease in the book effective tax rate. Similarly, for every one point increase in STRATEGY, there is a .42 percent decrease in the cash effective tax rate. Therefore, moving from a score of 5 (defendertype firm) to a score of 25 (prospector-type firm) is associated with a 8.4 percent decrease in the cash effective tax rate. This evidence is consistent with the argument that following a prospector strategy versus a defender strategy is not only statistically associated with lower effective tax rates, but also results in economically significant tax savings.
Overall, the above analyses indicate that firms that follow a defender strategy exhibit a lower level of tax avoidance compared with firms that follow a prospector strategy. These results suggest that even those tax avoidance activities generate tax savings for these firms, the costs and uncertainty associated with increased avoidance outweighs the benefit for defender firms.
[Insert Table 4 or firms with more fixed assets in place (e.g., defenders).
To examine the robustness of the full sample results, and to ensure our results are not being driven by loss firms, we restrict the sample to include only firms with strictly positive income during the period from 1998 through 2008. We exclude loss firms because these firms may have different incentives to engage in tax avoidance. We choose to exclude loss firms, as opposed to loss firm-years, because loss years not only affect the current year, but past and future years because of NOL carryfowards and carrybacks.
Therefore, only dropping the loss years could lead to the conclusion that a firm's tax burden was less than it was in reality. Restricting the sample to strictly profitable firms reduces the sample to 6,334 firm-year observations. Table 4 , Columns (C) and (D) presents the results for the reduced sample. The results are qualitatively similar to the full sample results, and thus lead to similar inferences. Again, we find that prospectors engage in more tax avoidance than defenders.
The Consistency of Firm Strategy
As an additional test of our STRATEGY measure, we consider whether the particular strategy adopted by a firm is consistent over time, as suggested by Miles and Snow (1978) . Therefore, we expect that prospector, defender or analyzer firms should have relatively stable STRATEGY scores from year-to-year. 23 Specifically, we expect firms classified as defenders to exhibit low STRATEGY scores and firms classified as prospectors to exhibit high STRATEGY scores over our sample period. To test the consistency of firms' strategies, we compute first differences for each firm-year STRATEGY score to determine how many total times a firm changed its STRATEGY score. We find that 24 percent of firms never changed their score from year-to-year while 36 percent of firms changed their score by one value (e.g. changing from 25 to 24). Only 5 percent of firms changed their score by more than 3 values. We thus conclude that our measure of strategy is relatively consistent throughout time.
Sensitivity Analysis
Defender/Prospector Indicator Variables
In this section, we discuss the results from estimating equation (1) after replacing our continuous STRATEGY measure in model (1) with indicator variables for defenders and prospectors. To examine whether defenders exhibit more or less tax avoidance than prospectors, we perform an F-test to compare the difference between the coefficients on DEFEND and PROSPECT. In untabulated results, we find that prospectors avoid more taxes than defenders when the BOOK_ETR is used as the dependent variable (F-Statistic = 9.26; Prob>F = 0.0024) and when the CASH_ETR is used as the dependent variable (FStatistic = 4.16; Prob>F = 0.0414). Thus, our main results are robust to this specification.
Is STRATEGY Capturing Something Different?
In this section, we examine whether our measure of strategy captures something different and over and above the other explanatory variables in our model. We begin by examining the correlations between STRATEGY and the other explanatory variables in 23 We would expect that firms classified as "reactors" would not exhibit relatively stable STRATEGY scores. We do not attempt to classify reactors,nor do we make any predictions for these firms. the 61 percent appears high this is offset by a low redundancy index. Specifically, the maximum shared variation between the two groups of variables is 11 percent, which is quite low and considered poor by analysis standards. Furthermore, the strongest shared variance observed (7 percent) is between PPEINTENSITY and the other canonical variates, which is not surprising because property, plant and equipment is in both groups.
This suggests that the combined strategy variable set captures related, but not substantially overlapping, information about the firm. We suggest this supports the notion that our STRATEGY variable represents aspects of the firm that are not represented by the additional variables in the model that have been documented as affecting firms' levels of tax avoidance.
Is Size Driving Our Results?
We conduct and additional sensitivity tests to confirm that our STRATEGY variable is not a proxy for firm size. We rank firms on our variable SIZE by forming quintiles within each 2-digit SIC industry-year. We create two indicator variables, Large, which equals one if a firm is in the top SIZE quintile and 0 otherwise, and Small, which equals one if the firm is in the bottom quintile. We then interact each of these indicator variables with our STRATEGY variable, and re-estimate equation (1) Given that our prospector firms are smaller on average than defender firms in the sample the significant interaction is not unexpected. The coefficient on Large is negative and significant indicating that large firms have lower effective tax rates while the STRATEGY variable continues to be negative and significant in all estimates.
Conclusion
We examine whether a firm's tax planning activities (i.e., tax avoidance) are influenced by its business strategy. Our research question is motivated by the results of prior literature, which finds that there is substantial unexplained variation in firms'
propensities to avoid income taxes.
To address our research question, we create a measure (STRATEGY) designed to provide a score that reflects the most likely business strategy adopted by sample firms.
We use this score to categorize firms as prospectors, defenders or analyzers. Using data from 1998 to 2008, we examine the association between firms' business strategy and two measures of tax avoidance, the book effective tax rate and the cash effective tax rate.
We find that defender firms engage in less tax avoidance than prospector firms, as demonstrated by higher book and cash effective tax rates. These results suggest that even though tax avoidance activities generate tax savings for these firms, the costs and uncertainty associated with increased avoidance outweighs the benefit.
Our study contributes to both the tax avoidance literature in accounting and the organizational theory literature in management in the following ways. First, we develop a replicable proxy of a firm's business strategy, which is constructed using publicly available data, and is more comprehensive than existing proxies in the accounting management literatures. Second, we contribute to the management literature by providing evidence that firms' tax planning activities are associated with their organizational strategy. Thus, our results empirically support Porter's (1996) 
Planning Growth
Cautious and incremental Growth occurs in spurts growth and advances in through product and market productivity development
Research and Development
Marketing
Capital Intensity
Management Characteristics
This table was constructed based on a review of the three viable business strategies identified by Miles & Snow (1978) . Miles and Snow (1978) identify fourth strategy, Reactors, which are generally presented as a "residual" type lacking any systematic strategy, design, or structure.
Analyzers Appendix A Strategic Type Characteristics
Defenders Prospectors
A firm that has a very narrow product-market domain, a focus on cost efficiency and a stable organizational structure.
A firm that has a very broad product-market domain, a focus on innovation and a flexible organizational structure.
A firm that has the attributes of both a prospector and a defender. The firm operates in two types of product market domains, one is relatively stable and the is changing.
Cost efficiency and stability Innovation and flexibility
Marketing and R&D experts are the most powerful members.
Finance and production experts are the most powerful members.
Strong focus on marketing
Tenure of executives is not lengthy and managers may be hired from outside or promoted from within.
Marketing experts, followed by production, and planning staff most important members. Tenure of executives is lengthy and managers are promoted from within.
Strong emphasis is on financial and production functions, and less on marketing The STRATEGY score is constructed based on the following five measures, drawn from Ittner et al. (1997) and Hambrick (1983) . Each of the variables are computed using a rolling average of the respective yearly ratios over the previous five years. We then rank each of the five variables by forming quintiles based on 2-digit SIC code and year. For each of the first four variables, firms in the top quintile receive a score of 5, those in the second highest quintile receive a score of 4, etc. The scoring for PPEINTENSITY5 is inverted, so that observations in the highest quintile receive a score of 1, those in the next highest quintile receive a score 
